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Security in a City Wide Testing Program
Anthony J. Polemeni, Ph.D.

In April 1974, a brouhaha erupted over the administration of the New York Citywide Reading Test and,
as a result, the entire testing program had to be restructured. All students in grades 2 through 9 in the
public schools had taken the test according to a mandate of the New York State Legislature. Unfortunately,
copies of the test had fallen into the hands of newscasters and newspaper reporters prior to the administration of the test. The allegation was made that
students, teachers, and parents also had prior access
to the tests and the results, therefore, were invalid.
As a consequence of all this, an investigation was
launched into what were termed irregularities in the
testing program. It was determined that in a few
schools the actual test booklets had been used for
coaching purposes and, while the overall impact had
no perceptible influence on the citywide mean grade
scores, public confidence in the use of "shelf-item"
standardized tests was effectively destroyed.
The situation was grave for three reasons: In
the first place, the results of the Citywide Reading
Test are used for the placement of pupils in compensatory and special education programs and as one basis
for the rete~tion and promotion of pupils--a matter of
tremendous concern to parents.
Secondly, the Citywide Test results are used to
rank all schools in the City of New York on the basis
of reading performance. Obviously, there is a good
deal of pride involved on the part of teachers and
principals within each school, and the notion of one's
placement in the ranking being depressed through chicanery on the part of another would be most offensive.
Finally, but importantly, was the reputation of
60,000 New York City public school teachers to be
maligned because 6 or 12 of their number had acted
foolishly?
In the face of these problems, New York City had
only two options: Scuttle the Citywide Testing Program
altogether, or develop a strategy for the administra-
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tion of a secure test--a test never before available
in the marketplace, and never before administered except for norming purposes.
The dilemma gave rise to a series of high-level
conferences to ensure that the matter be handled to
the satisfaction of everyone involved. The serious
nature of the problem was recognized: One assistant
principal had been demoted, and several teachers had
been officially reprimanded as a result of the scandal.
No one wanted a repetition. In the final analysis,
since a Citywide Reading Test score is necessary for
a variety of purposes--including evaluation, allocation of funds, and administrative decision making-New York City chose to go with a secure testing program. It was understood, universally, that all procedures had to be so carefully defined that there could
be no hint of improper practices. Such was the program that was developed in New York City.
Since that time, several of the major cities in
the United States have contacted New York City because
they were encountering the same problems and wanted to
know how New York had set up its program to ensure
against irregularity, and allegation of irregularity.
Since the replies were sketchy at best, and since increasing numbers of school systems throughout the
country can anticipate similar problems, it was felt
that a do-it-yourself-kit for security in a Citywide
Testing Program might find a responsive readership.
Such is the purpose of this article, and what follows
is a step-by-step description of what was done by the
Office of Educational Evaluation in New York City:
1. An application for pre-qualification as a bidder
on the New York Citywide Testing Program was
sent to 38 of the largest test publishing companies in the United States. Included in the
documentation sent to the publishers were the
general requirements for the tests, the answer
documents, and the manuals. One stipulation of
the pre-qualifying application read as follows:
"The test shall be 'secure' in that it shall
not be, nor ever have been, available to the
public." To ensure against charges of favoritism, at the same time that the applications were
sent to the 38 publishers, a public advertise-
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3.

4.

5.
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ment was placed in the City Record soliciting
bids on the secure reading test.
In all, seven replies were received. Of these,
five said they could not meet the requirements
and specifications. One company said they had
a secure test available, but the norms would not
be available before September 1975. This would
have been too late to meet Office of Educational Evaluation time lines. Only one company
replied that it had a secure standardized test
available and normed, and could meet all stipulated requirements.
The Director of the Office of Educational Evaluation, the Coordinator of Citywide Testing, and
a specialist in the New York City reading curriculum met with the publishers of the test to
ascertain that the test was valid for New York
City pupils, and that its reliability coefficient was acceptable. The tests were brought
to the meeting by the publisher's representative,
examined by Board of Education personnel, and
removed by the publisher's representative.
At no time prior to the actual delivery of the
tests by the publisher to the district depositories did any official or staff member of the
Board of Education keep a copy of the test in
his possession. The purpose of this precaution
was to ensure that should a leak occur it would
be the responsibility of the publisher rather
than of the Board of Education .
The title of the test was changed to the New York
City Reading Test and it was reprinted by the
publisher under maximum security procedures.
These procedures included an actual count of
each sheet of paper run through the printing
press, and the shredding of all misprinted
sheets.
Prior to the delivery of the tests to the districts, the Community School Superintendent
within each district was required to select a
depository to hold the testing materials for
all schools within that district. It was made
abundantly clear that security of the materials
during the time they were in the district
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depository was the responsibility of the Community Superintendent and that the depository,
therefore, must be kept locked or manned at all
times.
Compliance with all requests was maximal, since
no one wanted a repetition of the furor that had
accompanied the 1974 administration of the testing.
After a depository had been selected for each
district, a staff member of the Office of Educational Evaluation visited each one to confinn
that it was, in fact, secure, and that it was
large enough to acconunodate the materials and
the personnel to distribute them. It might be
noted, too, that all depositories had to be on
the ground floor, or accessible by freight elevator, in order that the trucker not be delayed
in his schedule. (The entire delivery to the
32 districts, for the 1000 schools, had to be
made in two days in order that there be minimum
opportunity for the booklets to go astray.)
To man the depositories, each district provided
two people (in most cases, the reading coordinator and the math coordinator) and the Office of
Educational Evaluation provided one staff member.
The function of these personnel, in the depositories, was to check the exact amount of materials delivered by the trucker, and to distribute these materials to school representatives.
As the school representatives arrived to pick up
the materials, they had to present a "School Register As Of Date Of Testing." The purpose of
this was to ensure that each school received no
more materials than were necessary at the time.
(The bulk printing order had been based on the
October registers, and these figures had changed
by April.)
Once the material for a school had been picked
up, and until that material was actually returned
to the test depository following completion of
the test, its security was the responsibility of
the school principal.
The test materials were picked up by the schools
one day prior to the test set for test adminis-
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tration. This was necessary in order that there
be time for distribution of the material to the
teachers, and tilne for the teacher to fill in
the identification grids. In most cases, the
principal called a special staff conference on
the afternoon of the day prior to test administration so that teachers might be properly instructed in the use, coding, packaging, and
labeling of the materials.
All tests, in all second through ninth grade
classes, in all public schools in New York City,
were administered on the same day. No exceptions were permitted. Those students who were
absent on the day of the test were retested at
a later date with a diffe~ent form of the test.
The scores of these retested students, while
they were given to teachers for classroom use,
were not entered in the statistical analysis of
the Citywide Reading Survey.
During the time of test administration, staff
members of the Office of Educational Evaluation
made unannounced visits to approximately 75
schools throughout the city. These visits were
unannounced only in the sense that no school
knew whether or not it would be visited; all
schools had been put on notice that such monitoring would occur on a random basis. No representative of the Office of Educational Evaluation.recorded any untoward incident during
these visits to the schools.
Every teacher had to submit an answer document
for every student on register as of the testing
date. The answer document had to be coded as
either "tested," "absent," or "excused as nonEnglish speaking." A student could be excused
as non-English " ... who in the opinion of the
school cannot reasonably be expected to read or
understand test content because of languagerelated difficulties." Pupils in CRMD, junior
guidance, health conservation, or visually handicapped classes were not included in the testing
program at all, since they were not on regular
class register.
Immediately following the test administration
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each teacher wrapped and labeled (separately)
the answer documents, the used test booklets,
and the unused test booklets and teacher manuals.
These packages were then sent to the principal's
office. No remnant of the testing materials was
to remain in the classroom of any teacher.
16. When the testing materials from each classroom
had been gathered in the principal's office,
they were returned to the district test depository where a receipt was issued. Again, no
remnant of the testing program was to remain
in any school.
17. On the first or second day following the test
date (and during which time the depositories remained manned or locked), the materials were
picked up by the trucker--in the presence of an
Office of Educational Evaluation representative-and shipped to the scoring centers.
18. While the tests were being scored, the test publisher began work on the development of a parallel form of the test for administration in 1976.
That test will be, or has been (depending on
whether this report appears in print before or
after March 30, 1976) administered under exactly
the same security procedures described above
since, as a result of the security procedures,
there was not a single allegation of irregularity during or following the entire testing program.
In summary then, New York City when faced with
the problem of developing a secure citywide test developed a strategy and solved the problem. Great for
New York City! But now a very pointed question: Supposing another large city--or 6, or 12, or 20 large
cities--wants to replicate the New York City strategy.
Where do all the "secure" tests come from?
This is a question for the major test publishers
to answer. It is likely, in the light of the New York
City experience, that they have already begun working
on the answer. Test publishers are in business to make
money; they must provide what the consumer demands. If
the questions addressed to New York City (which this
article has attempted to answer) are a portent, then
ever-increasing numbers of consumers will be demanding
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secure tests.
The consumer, for his part, must be willing to
pay a price for the security of his testing program.
New York City, for example, paid $129,300.00 in developmental costs for the 1976 version of its Citywide
Reading Test. This is a lot of money at any time; it
is a tremendous amount of money in this day of shrinking educational budgets.
Perhaps what is needed is the formation of an adhoc "think-tank" composed of Chief School Officers,
Heads of Evaluation, and fiscal and technical experts
from the major test publishing companies throughout
the United States.
If citywide testing is to continue, then educators, parents, and students have enough to worry about
in terms of validity and culture-fairness. They
should not have the additional concern that test results are invalid because the testing program itself
was not secure.

